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Abstract
This paper develops a four sector equilibrium search and matching
model with informal sector employment opportunities and educational
choice. We show that underground activities reduce educational at-
tainments if informal employment opportunities mainly are available
to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policy will in this
case improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of
remaining a low educated worker. Characterizing the optimal enforce-
ment policies, we nd that relatively more audits should be targeted
towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a too low
stock of educated workers is materialized.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have been puzzled by the fact that observed tax evasion, despite
low audit rates and fairly modest nes, is substantially lower than what is
predicted by theory. Andreoni et al (1998), argue that this discrepancy is
most likely explained by non-economic factors, such as moral, guilt, and
shame. However, Kleven et al (2011) whom conduct a large eld experiment
in Denmark, suggests that this discrepancy is explained by the degree of
third party reporting. As incomes for individuals are not self-reported, rather
reported by a third party such as the employer, it is di¢ cult, and thus costly,
to evade taxes. These costs, both due to third-party reporting, or even moral,
guilt or shame, tends to reduce the protability of evading taxes and limits
the size of the informal sector, although the expected punishment fees are
low relative to taxes.
In this paper we argue that these types of costs may explain why highly
educated workers to a lesser extent evade taxes and work informally than
low educated workers. If highly educated workers to a smaller extent work
in industries which handles cash-payments and to a larger extent are subject
to third party reporting, it will be more di¢ cult, and thus more costly, for
these workers to evade taxes.
This is supported by data. Evidence indicates that manual workers, or
workers with a lower level of formal education, to a substantially larger de-
gree face informal employment opportunities compared to highly educated
workers. Pedersen (2003), using the same questionnaire design for Germany,
Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden conrms that skilled blue
colour workers carry out more informal market activities than others. Figure
1 shows the extent of informal activities in the ve countries by industry.
Most informal work are carried out in the construction sector, followed by
the agricultural sector, and in hotels and restaurants.
2
16,1
0,3
25,0
1,7
9,6
0,8
4,4
16,8
1,2 2,0
6,7
0,5
9,1
6,6
3,2
1,3
14,8
13,1
1,3
0,3 0,4
5,0
0,0
0,9 0,2 0,3
1,3
2,2
0,9
1,40,7 1,4
1,1
2,2 2,0
3,9
0,1
1,7
6,6
0,8
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
Ag
ric
ult
ure
, fi
sh
ing
 an
d m
ini
ng
Ind
us
tri
Co
ns
tru
cti
on
W
ho
les
ale
 an
d r
eta
il t
rad
e
Ho
tel
s a
nd
 re
sta
ura
nts
Tr
an
sp
ort
, p
os
t a
nd
 te
lec
om
mu
nic
ati
on
Fin
an
cia
l in
ter
me
dia
tio
n a
nd
 bu
sin
es
s a
cti
vit
ies
Pu
bli
c a
dm
ini
str
ati
on
 an
d c
om
pu
lso
ry 
so
cia
l s
ec
uri
ty
Denmark Norway Sweden Germany Great Britain
Figure 1: Fraction of informal sector work by industry. Pedersen 2003.
Furthermore, performing logistic regressions for the ve countries, Peder-
sen (2003) conrms that the likelihood of informal market activities falls with
the length of education. In addition, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) show for
Sicily, that mainly workers at the lower end of the skill distribution engage
in informal activities.
The fact that mainly low educated workers seem to work in the informal
sector suggests that the choice of educational attainment is potentially dis-
torted by informal sector employment opportunities. The aim of this paper
is to investigate the equilibrium impact of underground activities on labour
market performance and educational attainment, as well as to characterize
the optimal enforcement policy. To that end, we develop a four sector gen-
eral equilibrium model featuring matching frictions on the labour market.
Unemployed workers search for jobs in both a formal and an informal sector,
and workers decide whether or not to acquire higher education based on
3
their ability levels.
In order to isolate the mechanisms and increase the transparency of the
model, we keep the di¤erences between the sectors at a minimum. The only
dissimilarity between the formal and the informal sector is that taxes are
not paid in the latter. Instead of paying taxes, informal sector rms have
to pay a ne in case they are hit by an audit and detected as tax cheaters.
In addition, rms in the informal sector are assumed to face concealment
costs. In our model, we let concealment costs capture costs associated with
concealing taxable income due to third party reporting or even moral, guilt
or shame. The costs reduce the protability of evading taxes and limits the
size of the informal sector although the expected punishment fees are low
relative to taxes. In line with Kleven et al (2010), we also let these costs be
higher the more income that is hidden from the tax authorities.
Early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where under-reporting of income is
modelled as a decision made under uncertainty.1 There has, however, been a
switch in research focus from individual decision making on the extent of eva-
sion, towards a modelling strategy where rms under-report their true prots,
sales and wages paid, as advanced economies nowadays make extensive use
of third-party information reporting.2 There has also been a movement to-
wards considering the case where rms or worker do not report at all. This
characterizes the informal sector in focus in this paper.
The present paper extends the recent strand of the tax evasion litera-
ture, which departs from the assumption of imperfectly competitive labour
markets, by incooperating involuntary unemployment through the inclusion
1Subsequent papers have since then enhanced the basic model of individual behavior by,
for example, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions. See for example Sandmo
(1981) for an early contribution of endogenous labour supply and underreporting of income.
2Also equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed. For example see the
early study by Cremer and Gahvari (1993) and the recent study by Tonin (2010).
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of search friction. See for example Fugazza and Jacques (2004), Kolm and
Larsen (2006), and Boeri and Garibaldi (2002).3 As apposed to these pre-
vious studies, we do not need to rely on asymmetries between the formal
and the informal sector, such as heterogeneity in moral, in order to generate
existence of both a formal and an informal sector.
We nd that underground activities reduce the incentives to acquire
higher education if informal employment opportunities mainly are available
to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement policies will in this case
improve educational incentives as it reduces the attractiveness of remaining
a low educated worker. However, if also highly educated workers to a large
extent are exposed to informal employment opportunities, the incentives to
acquire higher education may fall with stricter enforcement policies as un-
derground work pays o¤ better to workers with high productivity. Moreover,
we nd that the actual unemployment rate most likely increases with stricter
enforcement policies, although the o¢ cial unemployment rate falls. Finally,
characterizing the optimal enforcement policies, we nd that relatively more
audits should be targeted towards the sector employing low educated work-
ers, elsewise the outcome is a too low stock of educated workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is set-up. Sec-
tion 3 o¤ers a comparative statics analysis of an increase in the expected
punishment fee. Simulations are presented in Section 4, whereas Section 5
considers optimal policy, and nally Section 6 concludes.
3Some papers have also investigated informal employment from a non western economic
point of view. Albrecht et al (2009) considers the impact of payroll taxes and severance pay
on unemployment in the presence of an informal sector from a Latin American perspective.
The informal sector can be seen as an unregulated sector which is not a¤ected by payroll
taxes and other formal policies.
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2 The model
This section develops a four sector general equilibriummodel with formal and
informal sector employment opportunities and educational choice. Workers
di¤er in ability to acquire education. Abilities, e, are uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1; e 2 [0; 1], and the cost of higher education, c(e), is decreasing
in ability. Thus, workers with a high level of ability will nd it more than
worthwhile to attain higher education, whereas workers with low ability will
not. Workers not attaining higher education will from now on be referred to
as manual workers.
Both manual and highly educated workers allocate search e¤ort optimally
between the formal and the informal sector. Once matched with a rm, they
bargain over the wage. The economy thus consists of four sectors; the formal
and informal sector for manual workers, (denoted F;m and I;m), and the
formal and informal sector for highly educated workers (denoted F; h and
I; h).
2.1 Matching
Manual and highly educated workers search for jobs in both a formal and
an informal sector. For simplicity, we assume that only unemployed workers
search for jobs. This is a simplication, i.e. we do not acknowledge that the
connection to the labour market given by working in the formal sector may
bring about job opportunities not available while unemployed. The matching
functions for the four categories of jobs are given byXjl =
 
vjl
 1
2
 
jl

ul
 1
2
;
where Xjl is the sectorial matching rate, v
j
l ; is the sectorial vacancy rate, and
ul; is the unemployment rate, j = F; I and l = m;h. The rates are dened
as the numbers relatively to the labour force of manual and highly educated
workers, respectively. The exponents in the matching function is set to be
equal to a half in order to simplify the welfare analysis where we derive the
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optimal tax and punishment system when we have imposed the traditional
Hosios condition. In that case we can disregard congestion externalities as
the elasticity of the expected duration of a vacancy is equal to the bargaining
power of workers in a symmetric Nash bargaining situation.
Workers allocate search e¤ort optimally across the formal and the infor-
mal sector. Each workers total search intensity is exogenously given and
normalized to unity, where Il = l; denotes search e¤ort directed towards
the informal sector, and Fl = 1  l; l = m;h; denotes search e¤ort directed
towards the formal sector. The parameter  < 1 captures that the e¤ective-
ness of search falls with search e¤ort, i.e., the rst unit of search in one sector
is more e¤ective than the subsequent units of search. This could capture that
di¤erent search methods are used when searching for a job in a market. The
more time that is used in order to search in a market, the less e¢ cient search
methods have to be used.4
The transition rates into informal and formal sector employment for a
particular worker i, are Ili = 

li
 
Il
 1
2 and Fli = (1  li)
 
Fl
 1
2 ; where
Il = v
I
l = (

l ul) and 
F
l = v
F
l = ((1  l) ul) are labour market tightness,
l = m;h, measured in e¤ective search units. The rates at which vacant jobs
become lled are qjl =
 
jl
  1
2 ; j = F; I; l = m;h.
2.2 Value functions
Let Ul; EFl , and E
I
l denote the expected present values of unemployment and
employment for manual and highly educated workers. The value functions
4This particular modelling strategy of search e¤ort has a close resemblance to how
search is modelled in van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), where search for a job can
be conducted using di¤erent search channels.
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for worker i then reads:
rUli = R + 
F
li (E
F
l   Uli) + Ili(EIl   Uli)  I (l) c(ei); l = m;h; (1)
rEFli = R + w
F
li + s(Ul   EFli )  I (l) c(ei); l = m;h; (2)
rEIli = R + w
I
li + s(Ul   EIli)  I (l) c(ei); l = m;h; (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, wjl is the sector wage, and s is the
exogenous separation rate. R is a lump-sum transfer that all individuals
receive from the government which reects that the government has some
positive revenue requirements.5 Highly educated workers pay the individual
educational costs c(ei), where ei is the workers ability, ei 2 [0; 1]; c0(ei) < 0
and c00 (ei) > 0. The indicator function I (l) ; l = m;h takes the value zero for
manual workers and the value one for highly educated workers, hence I (m) =
0 and I (h) = 1.6 For simplicity, we disregard unemployment benets.
Let JFl and V
F
l represent the expected present values of an occupied job
and a vacant job in the formal sector, respectively. The arbitrage equations
for the formal sector of a job paying the wage wFli and a vacant job are then
rJFli = yl   wFli (1 + z) + s(V Fl   JFli ); l = m;h; (4)
rV Fl = q
F
l (J
F
l   V Fl )  kyl; l = m;h; (5)
where z is the payroll tax rate. Vacancy costs are denoted kyl. Analogous
5Everyone receives this transfer. The government cannot exclude the informal sector
workers as the government does not know who the informal sector workers are (if it did,
it could punish all of them).
6It is assumed to be costless to become a manual worker, but that workers who get a
higher education nd it costly to do so. This is a normalisation and has no consequences
for the results. Moreover, we assume that the educational cost is a cost to acquire and
maintain skill. This is a simplifying assumption and is not important for the results. The
assumption enables us to use a model without having workers continuously being born
and dying. Such a model would, however, generate the same qualitative expressions.
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notation for the informal sector yields:
rJ Ili = yl   wIli (1 + p + l) + s(V Il   J Ili); l = m;h; (6)
rV Il = q
I
l (J
I
l   V Il )  kyl; l = m;h; (7)
where p is the auditing rate which captures the probability of being detected
employing a worker in the informal sector, and  is the associated rm pun-
ishment fee rate. The l; l = h;m captures concealment costs. These con-
cealment costs capture that it is costly to hide income from the tax authori-
ties. The costs could, for example, capture what Kleven et al (2011) refer to
as third party reporting. When there is third party reporting of income, such
as the rm reporting the wage payments directly to the tax authorities, this
has to be agreed upon also by the worker, which is costly. These concealment
costs could also be other direct costs associated with concealing evasion, as
well as moral costs associated with evading taxes.
If rms hiring highly educated workers have a harder time concealing their
activities than rms hiring manual workers, then h > m. This is the case
if, for example, third party reporting is more common for highly educated
or, as assumed in Kleven et al (2011), the marginal costs of evasion increases
with amount of income evaded. Although this is likely to be the case, we do
not a priori impose any restriction on the values of l; l = h;m.
In order to improve the transparency of the model, we disregard taxation,
expected punishment and concealment costs on the worker side. This is of
no importance for the results.
The unemployed worker i allocates search between the two sectors, li, in
order to maximize the value of unemployment, rUli. A necessary condition
for an interior solution is that  < 1, which holds by assumption. The rst
order condition can be written as:
(1  li)1 
(li)
1  =

Fl
Il
 1
2 EFl   Uli
EIl   Uli
; l = m;h: (8)
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Workers allocate their search between sectors to equalize the net marginal
returns to search e¤ort across the two sectors.
2.3 Wage determination
When a worker and rm meet they bargain over the wage, wjli, taking econ-
omy wide variables as given. The rst order conditions from the Nash bar-
gaining with equal bargaining power for workers and rms, can be written
as:
JFl =
 
EFl   Ul

(1 + z) ; l = m;h; (9)
J Il =
 
EIl   Ul

(1 + p+ l) ; l = m;h; (10)
where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry condition, V jl = 0,
j = F; I, l = m;h:
We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated be-
tween the formal and the informal sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by
substituting (9) and (10) into (8) and using that JFl =
ky
qFl
and J Il =
ky
qIl
from
(5) and (7) together with free entry. This yields:
(1  l)1 
(l)
1  =
Fl
Il
 l; (11)
where
 l =
1 + p + l
1 + z
is the cost wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. When
workers allocate their search between the formal and the informal sectors
in equilibrium, they account for the wedge,  l, and for the formal relative
to the informal sectorial tightness, Fl =
I
l . It follows that relatively more
search will be directed towards the formal sector if expected punishment
plus concealment costs are higher than the tax payments, i.e. if  l > 1, and
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if formal sector tightness exceeds informal sector tightness, i.e., Fl =
I
l > 1.
And vice versa when  l < 1 and 
F
l =
I
l < 1.
By use of equation (1)-(7) and (11) in equations (9) and (10), equilibrium
producer wages, !jl , are given by:
!Fl = w
F
l (1 + z) =
1
2
yl

1 + k
Fl
(1  l)1 

; l = m;h; (12)
!Il = w
I
l (1 + p + l) =
1
2
yl

1 + k
Il
1 l

; l = m;h: (13)
An increase in tightness, jl , makes it easier for an unemployed worker to
nd a job, and at the same time harder for a rm to ll a vacancy. This
improves the workers relative bargaining position, resulting in higher wage
demands. An increase in search, will instead increase the rms relative
bargaining position. This follows as rms then will nd it easier to match
with a new worker in case of no agreement. The improved bargaining position
for rms moderates wage pressure.
2.4 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are
determined by equation (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition
and the wage equations (12) and (13):
k (r + s)
 
Fl
 1
2 =
1
2

1  k
F
l
(1  l)1 

; l = m;h; (14)
k (r + s)
 
Il
 1
2 =
1
2

1  k
I
l
1 l

; l = m;h; (15)
By use of the equilibrium search allocation equation in (11), where 
I
l
(l)
1  =
Fl
(1 l)1  l, in (15) it becomes clear that the wedge,  l, is the crucial factor
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determining the size of the formal sector in relation to the informal sector.7
When  l > 1, and thus expected punishment plus concealment costs are
higher than payroll taxes, informal sector producer wages are higher than
formal sector producer wages. In this case it is relatively more attractive for
rms to enter the formal sector, which makes formal sector tightness exceed
informal sector tightness. Hence, we obtain that Fl > 
I
l and l <
1
2
; l = m;h
if  l > 1. And vice versa when  l > 1.
As the formal sector exceeds the informal sector in size in most west-
ern countries, it is most realistic to consider the case when  l > 1. This
implies considering the situation when the expected punishment rate plus
concealment costs exceed the tax rate, i.e., p + l > z, which does not
seem unrealistic given a broad interpretation of concealment costs. In fact,
as discussed in the introduction, positive concealment costs l > 0 such that
p + l > z could potentially explain the puzzle of why we observe a rela-
tively small informal sector although we, at the same time, observe rather
low audit rates and fairly modest nes, i.e., p < z. However, we do not a
priori impose any restrictions on the size of  l; p or l when deriving the
results in this paper. When discussing results that depends on the size of
 l, however, we focus the discussion on, what we believe is the most realistic
case.
2.5 Education
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain a manual
worker, they compare the value of unemployment as an educated worker to
the value of unemployment as a manual worker. Workers with low ability
nd it too costly in terms of e¤ort to acquire higher education, whereas
7Relative tightness is determined by: Fl =
I
l =

1 kFl (1 l) 1
1 kFl (1 l) 1 l
2 > 1 if  l > 1
= 1 if  l = 1
< 1 if  l < 1
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high ability workers nd it more than worthwhile to do so since they face
lower costs of education. The marginal worker has an ability level, e^, which
makes him just indi¤erent between acquiring higher education and remaining
a manual worker. We write the condition determining the ability level of the
marginal worker as:
rUh (e^) = rUm: (16)
By using equations (1)-(3), it is clear that workers proceed to higher
education if the expected income gain of education exceed their cost of ed-
ucation. However, as wages are endogenous, we can use equations (1) and
(16) together with the rst order conditions for wages, and equations (5),
(7), (11), together with the free entry condition. This gives the following
rewriting of condition (16):
c (e^) =
k
1 + z
(yhoh   ymom) ; (17)
where ol = 
F
l = (1  h)1  ; l = h;m. Equation (17) gives e^ as a function of
the endogenous variables Fl and l, l = m;h. Workers with e  e^, choose not
to acquire education, whereas workers with e > e^ acquire education. Hence,
e^ and 1  e^ constitute the manual and educated labour forces, respectively.
The right hand side in equation (17) is the expected income gain of
attaining education. This gain needs to be positive in order for, at least
some, worker to proceed to higher education. The fact that productivity is
higher for highly educated workers, which gives rise to an educational wage
premium, provides incentives for higher education. However, higher educa-
tion may potentially also be associated with losses in expected income. For
example, if concealment costs are higher for highly educated workers, i.e.,
h > m, relatively more attractive informal employment opportunities for
manual workers will be foregone in case of higher education. This reduces
the incentives for education.
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Clearly, in order to study the non-trivial case, where at least some work-
ers proceed to higher education, it is necessary to assume that there is a
net gain in expected income of higher education. Thus, we need to assume
that productivity di¤erences between manual and highly educated workers
are su¢ ciently high, i.e., yh=ym > oFm=o
F
m. Moreover, to guarantee a non-
trivial interior solution where at least some, but not all, individuals choose
to acquire education, the individual with highest ability face a very low costs
of education, more specically c(1) = 0, and the individual with the low-
est ability face very high cost of education, i.e., lime!0 c(e) = 1. See the
appendix for the proof of existence of e^ 2 (0; 1).
2.6 Employment and Unemployment
The equations determining the employment rates in the formal sector and the
informal sector, nFl ; n
I
l , and the unemployment rates, ul; l = m;h; are given
by the ow equilibrium equations and the labour force identity.8 The o¢ cial
unemployment rate uol ; is given by u
o
l = ul +n
I
l . Solving for the employment
and unemployment rates yield:
nIl =
Il
s+ Il + 
F
l
; nFl =
Fl
s+ Il + 
F
l
; l = m;h; (18)
ul =
s
s+ Il + 
F
l
; uol =
s+ Il
s+ Il + 
F
l
; l = m;h: (19)
A comparison of the unemployment rates for manual and highly edu-
cated workers requires assumptions about the size of the concealment costs.
If concealments cost are higher for educated workers, i.e., h > m, the of-
cial unemployment rate is always lower for highly educated workers than
8For highly educated workers Ihuhe^ = sn
I
he^; 
F
h uhe^ = sn
F
h e^; and n
F
h + n
I
h = 1   uh,
and for manual workers Imum (1  e^) = snIm (1  e^) ; Fmum (1  e^) = snFm (1  e^) ; and
nFm + n
I
m = 1  um
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for manual workers, i.e., uoh < u
o
m. This is also what is observed in data.
However, if furthermore,  l > 1; l = h;m and hence the informal sector is
smaller than the formal sector, the actual unemployment rate is higher for
the highly educated workers, uh > um, i.e. in this case, manual workers have
a lower actual unemployment rate than highly educated workers if we also
include workers in the informal sector into the employment measure.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 The o¢ cial unemployment rate is lower for highly educated
workers, uoh < u
o
m, if they face higher concealment costs, h > m. The
actual unemployment rate is higher (lower) for highly educated workers, uh >
um (uh < um), if they face higher concealment costs, h > m, and these
concealment costs are high (low) enough to induce  l > 1 ( l < 1), l = m;h.
The actual and o¢ cial total number of unemployed workers are given by:
UTOT = e^um + (1  e^)uh;
U oTOT = e^u
o
m + (1  e^)uh:
3 Comparative statics
This section is concerned with the impact of more severe punishment of infor-
mal activities on labour market performance and educational attainment. We
only consider fully nanced changes in enforcement policies. Hence, changes
in the audit rate and the punishment fees are always followed by adjustments
in the tax rate so as to balance the government budget constraint given by:
e^
X
j=F;I
njmw
j
mz + (1  e^)
X
j=F;I
njhw
j
hp = R; (20)
where R is the exogenous revenue requirement.
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From (20) it follows that an increase in the audit rate or the punishment
fee, p or , or an increase in the tax rate, z, will, for a given tax base, always
increase government revenues. The tax base may, however, fall and thereby
reduce revenues. Throughout the analysis we will assume that we are located
on the positively sloped side of the "La¤er curves". This implies that the
direct e¤ect of taxation and punishment on government revenues will always
dominate the impact on revenues due to that the tax base may be reduced.
An increase in the audit or punishment rate then always calls for a reduction
in the tax rate in order to regain a balanced government budget. A fully
nanced increase in the punishment of the informal sector then induces  l
to increase both because p increases and because z falls.
In the government budget restriction in (20), potential auditing costs are
left out. To include auditing costs will not a¤ect any of the results derived
in the positive analysis below. However, it a¤ects the welfare analysis as
it tends to favour costless taxation and punishment fees at the expense of
auditing. The welfare analysis thus includes a separate section deriving the
implications for the case including auditing costs.
Proofs of all Propositions follow from straightforward comparative statics
and are available upon request.
3.1 Sector Allocation
The e¤ects on the allocation of search and employment across the formal and
the informal sector are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A fully nanced increase in the audit rate, p; or the pun-
ishment fee, , will reallocate search intensity and employment towards the
formal sector, i.e., l falls, nFl increases, and n
I
l falls.
More zealous enforcement will make informal work less attractive, induc-
ing unemployed workers to reallocate their search e¤ort towards the formal
16
sector. However, when search is reallocated towards the formal sector, the
wage bargaining position strengthens for rms in the formal sector whereas
it falls for rms in the informal sector. The lower producer wages in the
formal sector stimulates formal rms to open vacancies, while at the same
time, informal rms are discouraged to open new vacancies as they now face
higher producer wages. As a consequence of that both vacancies and search
e¤ort is reallocated towards the formal sector, the formal sector employment
rate increases at the expense of informal employment.
3.2 Unemployment Rates
As became clear in proposition 2, employment in the formal sector increases
at the expense of employment in the informal sector following more severe
punishment of the informal sector. While this is somewhat expected, it is a
prior not clear what would happen to the unemployment rates. We have the
following results:
Proposition 3 A fully nanced increase in the audit rate, p; or in the pun-
ishment fee, , will always cause the o¢ cial unemployment rate (uol ) to
fall, whereas the actual unemployment rate (ul) increases if  l > 1 (falls
if  l < 1).
The actual unemployment rates increase with more severe punishment of
informal work if  l > 1. The reason for this is that the large concealments
costs discourages workers from searching, and rms from opening vacancies,
in the informal sector. In fact, too few rms and too little search are allocated
into the informal sector from an e¢ ciency point of view. Increased punish-
ment of the informal sector will encourage further reallocation of search and
workers away from the informal sector, where relatively e¢ cient search meth-
ods are used, towards the formal sector. Total search e¢ ciency then falls,
inducing unemployment to increase.
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The fact that search becomes less e¢ cient when reallocated towards the
formal sector also has an impact on unemployment working through wage
formation and tightness. As search is reallocated towards the formal sector,
the wage demand is moderated in the formal sector and exaggerated in the
informal sector. As search e¢ ciency in the formal sector increases by less than
search e¢ ciency in the informal sector is reduced, the informal sector wage
push will dominate the formal sector wage moderation. Thus, the incentives
to open up a vacancy in the formal sector subseeds the disincentives to open
up a vacancy in the informal sector; formal sector tightness will increase by
less than informal sector tightness falls when  l > 1.
The opposite holds if  l < 1. In this case too much search, and too
many rms, are allocated into the informal sector as there is a relative cost
advantage of producing underground. Total search e¢ ciency would then
improve when the government tries to combat the informal sector.
The o¢ cial unemployment rate always falls with more harsh punishment
of informal activates as workers to a larger extent becomes formally employed.
In this unemployment measure, workers in the informal sector where counted
as unemployed to start with.
3.3 Education
From (17) it is clear that more severe punishment of the informal sector a¤ect
the number of educated workers as such policy increases  l. This e¤ect is
further reinforced if the tax rate is reduced in order to assure a balanced
government budget as the increase in  l is reinforced by a reduction in z.
However, a reduced payroll tax rate will also have a direct e¤ect on the stock
of educated workers. More specically, a reduction in the tax rate, z, for
a given wedge, will increase the number of educated workers. This follows
as taxation is more harmful to high income earners, and consequently a tax
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reduction will improve the income relatively more for high income earners.
However, let us rst consider the impact of a more zealous enforcement
policy on education, for a given tax rate. We have the following results:
Proposition 4 An increase in the audit rate, p; or the punishment fee, ,
will increase (reduce) the number of educated workers if the relative produc-
tivity of education is in the following range yh
ym
2
h
om
oh
; g (h; m)
om
oh
i
( yh
ym
2h
g (h; m)
om
oh
;1
i
) where g (h; m) > 1 if h > m.
Proof. We know from above that the existence of an interior solution of
e^ requires that yh=ym > om=oh. Di¤erentiating the educational equation
with respect to expected punishment reveals that the impact on education is
determined by the sign of ym jdom=d (p)j   yh jdoh=d (p)j which is equal to
the sign of yh=ym   g (h; m) (om=oh). See the appendix for a full proof.
The impact of a more zealous enforcement policy on educational attain-
ment depends on how attractive underground work is to manual and educated
workers, respectively. When concealment costs are higher for highly educated
workers, more zealous enforcement policies tend to induce more workers to
educate themselves. This follows as h > m implies that manual workers to
a larger extent face informal labour market opportunities. Therefore, more
zealous enforcement policies, which makes it less attractive to work in the
informal sector, will be more harmful to manual workers.
This e¤ect may, however, be counteracted by the fact that highly educated
workers have higher productivity and therefore also earn higher wages. As
also informal activities are highly productive for these workers, this implies
that more harsh punishment, in this perspective, are more harmful for highly
educated worker. Thus, even if highly educated workers face less informal
employment opportunities, these opportunities are more protable. This
reduces educational incentives.
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Which of the two e¤ects dominate will thus depend on how sizable the
di¤erences in informal employment opportunities and productivity are. If
underground employment opportunities in an economy foremost are available
to manual workers, more harsh punishment of underground activities will
push more workers into education. Thus increasing the stock of educated
workers in the economy. However, if these employment opportunities to a
large extent also are available for highly educated workers, harder punishment
will harm highly educated workers more as these opportunities are more
protable to productive workers. This leads to that less workers educate
themselves.
Note that proposition 4 only provides the su¢ cient conditions for when
the educational stock increases and when it falls with more harsh punish-
ment of the informal sector without considering the nancing of the reform.
Provided that we are located on the positively sloped side of the La¤er curve,
we can conclude the following:
Proposition 5 If an increase in the audit rate, p; or in the punishment rate,
, increases the number of educated workers as given by proposition 4, the
nancing of the reform will further increase the stock of educated workers.
This simply follows as taxation as a direct e¤ect is more harmful for high
income earners, and consequently a tax reduction, in order to maintain a
balanced government budget, will be more benecial for high income earners,
thus encouraging educational attainments.
3.4 Unemployment
From proposition 3, 4 and 5, it follows that more severe punishment of the
informal sector potentially increases the total number of unemployed work-
ers. If the formal sector is larger than the informal sector, the unemployment
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rates for both manual and highly educated workers are augmented. More-
over, if informal employment opportunities to a signicantly larger extent
are available for manual workers, more workers will attain higher education
when informal activities is punished more severely. This tends to increase
total unemployment as the actual unemployment rate, including informal
work, is higher for highly educated workers. Thus, in this case, total un-
employment increases both because the unemployment rates for all workers
increase, and because workers are reallocated towards the sector where the
unemployment rate is highest. More generally, the proposition summarizes
the result:
Proposition 6 A fully nanced increase in the audit rate, p; or in the pun-
ishment fee, , increases(decreases) the number of unemployed workers if the
relative productivity of education is in the following range yh
ym
2
h
om
oh
; g (h; m)
om
oh
i
where g (h; m) > 1 if h > m, and  l > 1(<  l).
4 Numerical Simulations
In this section we perform simulations of the model in order to quantify the
e¤ects of enforcement policies on labour market performance and educational
attainments. The educational costs are captured by the following cost func-
tion: c (e) = g (1  e)t, where the parameters g and t are used to match the
OECD average fraction of 25 to 64 years old with tertiary education of 27.5
percent (OECD 2009). The year is used as the basic time unit, and the pro-
ductivity of manual workers are normalized to unity, ym = 1. The discount
rate is set to r = 0:08 as is the separation rate, s = 0:08 (see Millard and
Mortensen 1997).
The productivity of highly educated workers yh, the hiring cost para-
meter, k; the search e¢ ciency parameter, , and the concealment costs, h
and m, are set so as to match an average observable unemployment rate of
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10%, with an observable unemployment rate for manual workers of slightly
less than 12%, and for highly educated workers of about 6%. These o¢ cial
unemployment rates are slightly higher than the pre-nancial crises average
in the OECD countries. The reason for this is partly that the model overes-
timates the o¢ cial unemployment rates as all informally employed workers
are assumed to be unemployed job searchers.9 The employment rates for the
informal sector are chosen to be between 5% and 15%. The parameter values
we use are the following :
r s h m k  yh ym p M g t
0:08 0:08 0:9 0:75 0:4 0:35 1:25 1 0:05 3 0:5 1:1
In this case we obtain the values given in Table 1. The endogenous
payroll tax rate, z, which always balances the government budget constraint
is initially equal to 20%.
9Based on labour market surveys, the o¢ cial unemployment rate is measured by uo =
Uo
LF o , where the U
o is the total number of unemployed job searchers and LF o is the o¢ cial
labour force. In the model, everyone who is employed in the informal sector belongs to
the labour force which implies that uo = U
o+EI
U+EF+EI
. However, if some workers employed
in the informal sector is counted as out of the labour force, which is likely the case in
the labour statistic, the observed unemployment rate in the labour statistics meassure
uo = U
o+EI
U+EF+EI
, where  is the share of the informal workers being out of the labour
force. Thus an  < 1 implies that the model value of the o¢ cial unemployment rate
should match to a higher value of unemployment than suggested by the labour statistics.
This is of no importance for the analytical results, although it biases the values slightly in
the numerical analysis.
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Table 1: Impact of higher expected punishment
p = 0:05 p = 0:07 p = 0:09
uh; um 0.0215, 0.0204 0.0217, 0.0207 0.0219, 0.0210
uoh; u
o
m 0.0574, 0.1169 0.0469, 0.1005 0.0380, 0.0850
1  e^ 0.2750 0.2780 0.2811
UTOT ; U
o
TOT 0.0207, 0.1005 0.0210, 0.0856 0.0212, 0.0718
nIh=n
F
h ; n
I
m=n
F
m 0.0381, 0.1092 0.0265, 0.0888 0.0168, 0.0700
z 0.2000 0.1899 0.1793
When expected punishment of informal activities become more zealous,
unemployment increases but as informal sector employment falls, observable
unemployment decreases too. In this case education increases. The impact
of stricter punishment policies are illustrated in Figure 2.
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The analytical part conrmed that tighter enforcement policy had an
ambiguous e¤ect on educational attainments. Harsher punishment tends to
increase educational attainments as manual workers face more informal em-
ployment opportunities when h > m, i.e., the "employment opportunity
e¤ect". On the other hand, more severe punishment tends to reduce edu-
cational attainments because highly educated workers are more productive,
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i.e., the "productivity e¤ect". In equilibrium (when z adjusts so to balance
the government revenue), a reduction in z reinforces the employment oppor-
tunity e¤ect. We observe in our benchmark case, see Figure 3, that when z is
exogenously xed, educational attainments increase with stricter punishment
of informal work, although the e¤ect is smaller.
We showed analytically that the relative importance for the two counter-
acting e¤ects on educational attainments hinged on di¤erences in l and yl.
But even for very high productivity levels facing the highly educated work-
ers, education increases with p for a given z. We increase the parameter
g simultaneously so to keep the initial educational level at 1   e^ = 0:275.
As shown analytically in proposition 4, letting m increase to the same size
as h, causes the productivity e¤ect to dominate, leading to a reduction in
the educational attainments for a given z. This is, however, a less plausible
outcome in terms of the relative size of informal-formal employment.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to the other parameters of the model,
reveals that the results are sensitive to changes in . When  is relative
small, i.e.  = 0:25, and m increases to m = 0:85 education falls for xed
z. See Figure 4. However allowing for z to adjust to maintain government
budget balance reestablishes the positive impact on education.
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5 Welfare
This section is concerned with welfare analysis and the optimal design of
punishment policies. As shown above, increasing the punishment fees or the
audit rates a¤ect the number of educated workers as well as the allocation
of search and jobs across the formal and informal sectors. This is essential
when considering the impact on welfare.
We make use of a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by adding
all individualssteady state ow values of welfare. This accounts for that both
the formal and the informal economy generate welfare in the economy. The
social welfare function is written as:
W = e^ ~Wm +
Z 1
e^
~Whde;
where
~Wm = umrUm +
X
j=F;I
njmrE
j
m +
X
j=F;I
njmrJ
j
m +
X
j=F;I
vjmrV
j
m + n
I
mrJ
law
m ;
~Wh = uhrUh +
X
j=F;I
njhrE
j
h +
X
j=F;I
njhrJ
j
h +
X
j=F;I
vjhrV
j
h + n
I
hrJ
law
h :
We assume that rms are owned by renterswho do not work. This
explains the presence of
P
j=F;I n
j
mrJ
j
m +
P
j=F;I v
j
mrV
j
m and
P
j=F;I n
j
hrJ
j
h +P
j=F;I v
j
hrV
j
h in the welfare function. Moreover, we assume that the conceal-
ment costs for tax evasion facing rms are payments to "lawyers" who only
engage in concealing taxable income for other rms. The welfare function
therefore includes nImrJ
law
m = n
I
mw
I
mm and n
I
hrJ
law
h = n
I
hw
I
hh. This as-
sumption enables us to disregard from the waste associated with tax evasion
if rms only pay these expenses to nobody.
By making use of the asset equations, imposing the ow equilibrium con-
ditions as well as the government budget restriction in (20), and considering
the case of no discounting, i.e., r ! 0, we can write the welfare function as:
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W = e^Wm +
Z 1
e^
Whde; (21)
Wm = (1  um) ym   umkymm; (22)
Wh = (1  uh) yh   uhkyhh   c (e) ; (23)
where l = (1  l) Fl + l Il ; l = m;h. This welfare measure is analo-
gous to the welfare measure described in, for example, Pissarides (2000) as
it includes aggregate production minus total vacancy costs, i.e. note that
ullk =
 
vFl + v
I
l

k; l = m;h. With the assumption of risk neutral individ-
uals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages will not feature in the
welfare function.
Let us rst derive the socially optimal choice of tightness, search and
stock of educated workers by maximizing the welfare function in (21)-(23)
with respect to Fm; 
I
m; 
F
h ; 
I
h; m; h and e^. The socially optimal solution are
solved from the following seven conditions:
 1l   (1  l ) 1 = 0; ! l =
1
2
l = m;h (24)
 sk  Il  12 + 12
"
1  k
I
l 
1
2
1 
#
= 0; l = m;h; j = F; I(25)
(yh   ym) k
I
l 
1
2
1    c (e^) = 0: (26)
We can now compare the socially optimal solution with the market out-
come. From (11), (14), and (15) it follows that the market solution for search
and tightness coincides with the socially optimal allocation if the imposed
tax and punishment policy are such that  m =  h = 1.
10
10When  m =  h = 1 is imposed on the private solution, it follows from (14), (15) that
tightness in the formal and the informal sector is equal, and that search must be split
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This conclusion is intuitive as any policy that induces a deviation of the
 j; j = m;h; from unity, implies a favourable treatment of the formal or the
informal sector which, in turn, induces a distortion in the sectorial allocation
of search and tightness between the formal and informal sectors. For example,
if search to a larger extent is allocated to the formal or informal sector instead
of the other, search is ine¢ ciently used as less e¢ cient search methods in that
sector needs to be used. Moreover, as discussed in relation to proposition
3, a favourable treatment of either the formal or the informal sector induce
too many rms to open vacancies in that sector without accounting for the
externality they impose on others. In fact, unemployment is minimized when
the allocation of search and tightness across the formal and informal sector
is equal, and so is vacancy costs. Thus, welfare is maximized when search
and tightness are allocated equally across the formal and the informal sector.
Now let us compare the socially optimal stock of educated workers with
the educational outcome induced by the market. As the market outcome
in terms of sectorial allocation of search and tightness coincided with the
socially optimal one when the government lets the market face  m =  h = 1,
we evaluate also the private outcome of education under these conditions.
This yields the following market outcome of the stock of educated workers:
(yh   ym) k
I
l
(1 + z)
 
1
2
1    c (e^) = 0: (27)
It immediately follows that a tax and punishment policy which implies
that  m =  h = 1, will not provide incentives to the market to generate
a socially optimal stock of educated workers. Comparing (26) and (27),
in fact, reveals that the market outcome induces too few workers to educate
themselves if formal and informal sector jobs face uniform treatment in terms
equally between the formal and the informal sector, i.e.,  = 12 from (11). Imposing  =
1
2
and Fl = 
I
l , l = m;h, and assuming r = 0 in (14) and (15), yiels the same expression as
(25).
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of  m =  h = 1. This follows as taxes, captured by (1 + z) in (27), hits
highly educated workers more severely than manual workers, which reduces
the incentives of education. From this we can conclude that welfare would
increase if more workers chose to educate themselves when  m =  h = 1.
This discussion brings us to the governments explicit choice of tax and
punishment policy. How should the government punish informal work in
order to maximize welfare?
5.1 Optimal punishment policy
The welfare analysis above indicates that it may be optimal to punish tax
evading activities carried out by manual workers more severely than those
carried out by highly educated workers. For example, if concealment costs are
higher for highly educated workers, a punishment policy with  m =  h = 1
is only possible if the manual workers to a larger extent than highly educated
workers face punishment of informal activities. That is, p have to be set
relatively higher for manual workers if m < h in order to induce  m =
 h = 1.
This raises the question of whether it is possible or not to target the
punishment fees and audit rates towards the sector employing manual vs
highly educated workers. While governments potentially could, and in fact
do,11 target their audits to specic sectors, i.e. allowing for pm to di¤er from
ph, this is less likely the case for the fee rates.
To nd the socially optimal choice of audit rates for the sector employing
manual workers and the sector employing highly educated workers, the wel-
fare function in (21)-(23) is maximized by choice of pm and ph subject to the
market reactions given by (11), (14), (15), (17) and (19) and the government
budget restriction in (20). This yields the following rst order conditions:
11See, for example, Kleven et al 2011.
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dW
dpm
= e^
dWm
d m
d m
dpm
+
dW
d (1  e)
d (1  e)
dpm
= 0; (28)
dW
dph
= (1  e^) dWh
d h
d h
dph
+
dW
d (1  e)
d (1  e)
dph
= 0; (29)
where dWl
d l
=
hP
j=F;I
dWl
djl
djl
d l
+ dWl
dl
dl
d l
i
; j = m;h. Evaluating the rst order
conditions at the levels of pm and ph ensuring that  m =  h = 1 turns out
to be very convenient and gives:
dW
dpm
j  m=1 =
dW
d (1  e^)
d (1  e^)
dpm
> 0; (30)
dW
dph
j  h=1 =
dW
d (1  e^)
d (1  e^)
dph
< 0: (31)
Provided that we are located on the positively sloped side of the La¤er
curves, we can conclude that:
Proposition 7 Welfare is maximized when the sector employing manual
workers are audited to a larger extent than the sector employing highly edu-
cated workers, i.e., pm > ph so to get  

h < 1 <  

m if h  m.
Proof. Evaluate the rst order conditions (28) and (29) at  m =  h = 1.
From the socially optimal allocation of search and tightness,  l = 1 implies
that dWl
dFl
= dWl
dIl
= dWl
dl
= 0; l = m;h. Then dW
dpm
j m=1= dWd(1 e) d(1 e)dpm > 0, and
dW
dph
j h=1= dWd(1 e) d(1 e)dph < 0 as dWd(1 e) > 0 from (26) and (27) and
d(1 e^)
dpm
>
0; d(1 e^)
dph
< 0 from (17). Thus welfare improves by reallocation of audits
towards the manual sector. If h = m, pm = ph at  m =  h = 1, welfare
improves by setting pm > ph. If h > m, the results are reinforces as pm > ph
already when  m =  h = 1, and welfare improves by further increasing pm
and reducing ph.
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The result in proposition 7 follows straightforwardly from the rst order
conditions when evaluated at the pm and ph which induces  m =  h = 1. The
rst term on the right hand side of equations (28) and (29) then disappears
as the distortions in search and allocation of tightness across the formal and
the informal sectors are fully eliminated. In this case there are no other
distortions present except for that too few workers have chosen to educate
themselves. Recall that this is a consequence of that taxation harms high
income earners relatively more. This distortion can, however, be corrected for
by increasing the audits in the manual sector and reducing them in the sector
for highly educated workers, which is captured by the right hand side in (30)
and (31). As informal sector work for manual workers becomes less attractive
when the government increases the number of audits, manual workers are
encouraged to acquire higher education. Similarly, less audits in the highly
educated sector further encourages workers to acquire higher education.
If concealment costs are higher in the sector employing highly educated
workers, i.e., h > m, there are even further incentives for the government
to focus their audits on the manual sector. This follows as high conceal-
ment costs work as a self-regulating punishment of informal sector activities.
Thus, if concealment costs are higher in the sector employing highly educated
workers, this sector will be in less need of audits as concealment costs will
do part of the job limiting the size of the informal sector.
Moreover it follows that:
Corollary 8 The stock of educated workers is below its socially optimal value
when the audit rates are chosen so to maximize welfare.
Proof. See appendix.
When deciding on the optimal audit rates the government face a trade-o¤
between two distortions, and it is never optimal to fully eliminate one of them.
When the stock of educated workers is at its socially optimal level, there is an
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ine¢ cient allocation of search and jobs across the formal and informal sectors.
Welfare then improves as the stock of educated workers is reduced below its
socially optimal level as this will only be a second order e¤ect in comparison
to the improved welfare following a more e¢ cient sectorial allocation.
5.2 Optimal punishment policy when concealment costs
are high
In deriving the optimal audit rates in the previous section, it was implicitly
assumed that audit rates could be chosen freely without restrictions. For
example, according to proposition 7, the audit rates should be chosen such
that pm > p

h so to get  

h < 1 <  

m. However, this is only possible if
concealment costs are not too high. If, for example, h > z then  h > 1
even when ph is very small. Replacing the rst order condition in (29) with
the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker conditions, dW
dph
+  = 0, ph  0, and ph = 0,
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint ph  0, then suggest that
the audit rate in the sector should be set as low as possible when h > z.
Concealment costs are simply high enough to self-regulate the size of the
informal sector facing highly educated workers, and there is no need for
additional audits of this sector.12
Taking o¤ in real world observations from western economies, this may
not be an unrealistic scenario. Evidence indicates that manual workers, or
workers with a lower level of formal education, to a substantially larger de-
gree face informal employment opportunities compared to highly educated
workers. Pedersen and Smith (1998) using comprehensive survey data, nd
that almost half of the informal sector activities in Denmark are carried out
within the construction sector. They also nd that around 70 percent of the
12This clearly holds also for the manual sector if concealment cost are higher than the
tax rate.
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total hours performed in the informal sector is carried out within the service
sector or construction sector.
Potential explanations for why manual, in contrast to highly educated,
workers engage in informal activities are that manual workers to a larger
extend work in industries which handles cash-payments or are to a lesser
extend subject to third-party reporting. Firms and workers in industries
dealing with cash-payments, or which to a lesser extent are subject to third-
party reporting, will nd it easier, and thus less costly, to conceal their tax
evasion. Taking this at face value implies that concealment costs for highly
educated workers, h, could be very large. If h is assumed to approach
innity, informal employment opportunities facing highly educated workers
will become innitely small, leading to that basically no rms will post in-
formal sector vacancies to highly educated workers and none of the highly
educated workers will allocate search e¤ort into the informal sector. All the
results derived in propositions 1 to 6 accounts for this special case, including
the now clear cut result that higher punishment fees, or a general increase
in the audit rate, encourage more workers to educate themselves. This fol-
lows as less workers will remain as manual workers as the forgone informal
employment opportunities when attaining education has become less attrac-
tive. Moreover, the socially optimal audit rate is again being determined by
an audit rate which implies that pm is set large enough so to get  

m > 1;
although not high enough to induce an e¢ cient stock of educated workers.
5.3 Optimal punishment policy including auditing costs
Adding costs of auditing to the government budget constraint in (20) yields:
e^
X
j=F;I
njmw
j
mz + (1  e^)
X
j=F;I
njhw
j
hp  ' (p) = R; (32)
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where ' (p) is the cost of audits, and p is the total intensity of audits, p =
pm + ph. Adding costs of auditing will have no impact on the results derived
in the positive analyses. However, the welfare function in (21) is now equal
to
W = e^Wm +
Z 1
e^
Whde  ' (p) ;
where the rst order conditions for optimal audit rates in the sectors em-
ploying manual and highly educated workers are given by:
dW
dpm
= e^
dWm
d m
d m
dpm
+
dW
d (1  e)
d (1  e)
dpm
  '0 (p) = 0; (33)
dW
dph
= (1  e^) dWh
d h
d h
dph
+
dW
d (1  e)
d (1  e)
dph
  '0 (p) = 0; (34)
where, again, dWl
d l
=
hP
j=F;I
dWl
djl
djl
d l
+ dWl
dl
dl
d l
i
; j = m;h. The inclusion of
auditing costs reduces the optimal level of audits in both sectors. The result
from proposition 7, that welfare is maximized when the government to a
larger extent targets its audits to the manual sector, i.e., pm > ph if h  m,
will however still hold.
6 Conclusion
There has recently been an intensied focus on issues related to tax evasion
and informal activities from both a policy and research perspective.13 The
study by Kleven et al (2011), which conducted a large eld experiment in
Denmark, made it possible to address, and convincingly answer, a number of
13The OECD recently initiated the "Global forum of transparency and exchange of in-
formation for tax purposes" (OECD, 2010), whereas the European commission conducted
the rst EU wide comparable questionnaire in order to increase the knowledge about tax
evasion in Europe (see EC, 2007).
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questions related to tax compliance behaviour, that had not been answered
before.
This paper uses this knowledge to investigate the general equilibrium
implications of informal sector activities on economic performance. A number
of questions can be asked. How will informal employment opportunities a¤ect
labour market performance and educational attainments? Can informal jobs
really be turned into formal jobs by more zealous punishment policies? And if
so, to what extent will formal sector jobs replace jobs in the informal sector?
In order to address these questions, we develop a four sector equilibrium
search and matching model with informal sector employment opportunities
and educational choice. We nd that informal activities reduces the in-
centives to acquire higher education if informal employment opportunities
mainly are available to low educated workers. More zealous enforcement
policies will in this case improve educational incentives as it reduces the at-
tractiveness of remaining a low educated worker. Moreover, we nd that
stricter enforcement policies will create new jobs in the formal sector, al-
though most likely to a lesser extent than the number of jobs destructed in
the informal sector. This will lead to an increase in the actual unemployment
rates although the o¢ cial unemployment rates fall. Finally, characterizing
the optimal enforcement policies, we nd that relatively more audits should
be targeted towards the sector employing low educated workers, elsewise a
too low stock of educated workers could materialize.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Tightness relatively to search intensity
We show that 
F
t
(1 t)1  <
Fx
(1 x)1  when t > x in the following way.
Di¤erentiating equations (14),(15) and (11) with respect to l gives around
the equilibrium:
dFl
dl
=
(1 )
1 l
kFl
(1 l)1 
1
2

1 + k
I
1 l

1
Il
Dl
(1 + z) > 0; (35)
dIl
dl
=  
1
2

1 +
kFl
(1 l)1 

1
Fl
(1  ) kIl  2l
Dl
(1 + z) < 0; (36)
dl
dl
=  
1
2

1 +
kFl
(1 l)1 

1
Fl
1
2

1 + k
I
1 l

1
Il
Dl
(1 + z) < 0; (37)
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1 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
1
Il
1
Fl

1  k
F
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(1  l)1 

(1 + z) < 0:
Hence, if t > x then
Ft
(1 t)1  <
Fx
(1 x)1  .
7.2 Existence of e^ 2 (0; 1) :
Consider the educational equation
c (e^) =
k
1 + z
(yhoh   ymom) ;
where ol =
kFl
(1 l)1  ; l = h;m. For a non-trivial solution, there need to be
a net gain in expected income of higher education. Thus, yh=ym > om=oh.
Moreover, to guarantee a non-trivial interior solution where at least some, but
not all, individuals choose to acquire education, the individual with highest
ability face a very low costs of education, more specically c(1) = 0, and
the individual with the lowest ability face very high cost of education, i.e.,
lime!0 c(e) =1.
In case h  m then om=oh < 1 and hence yh=ym > om=oh holds as
yh > ym. If educated workers face higher concealment costs than manual
workers h > m, then we need to assume that yh=ym > om=oh holds, which
is possible to ensure as the right hand side is independent of yl.
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7.3 Formal versus informal sector employment
Relative employment for formal versus informal workers depends on conceal-
ment costs l; l = h;m. We consider the impact on relative employment of
a higher l. Noting that nFl =n
I
l = 
F
l =
I
l =

(1  h)
 
Fl
 1
2

=

l
 
Il
 1
2

we need to examine the impact on relative transition rates from higher l.
Using equations (35)-(37) we can conclude that
d
 
nFl =n
I
l

d l
=

(1  l)
 
Fl
 1
2

=

l
 
Il
 1
2

d l
> 0:
Hence, when t > x; formal relatively to informal sector, is higher for t
workers than for x workers, nFt =n
I
t > n
F
x =n
I
x.
7.4 Relative unemployment rates
Unemployment is increasing in concealment costs if  l > 1. Hence if t > x
then ut > ux if  l > 1. We show that in the following way, ut > ux if and
only if
s
s+ Fx + 
I
x
<
s
s+ Ft + 
I
t
if an only if
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I
t < 
F
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I
x
Hence, the condition holds if
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We substitute for the derivatives and the rst order condition for search
intensity to obtain the condition
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which is negative when  l > 1, as then
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>
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
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
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: Hence unemployment increases with  l
and hence ut > ux when t > x.
The o¢ cial unemployment rate facing t workers is higher than the o¢ cial
unemployment rate facing x workers, uot > u
o
x if and only if
s+ It
s+ Ft + 
I
t
>
s+ Ix
s+ Fx + 
I
x
:
This holds if an only if
Fx
 
s+ It

> Ft
 
s+ Ix

;
which is true when Fx > 
F
t and 
I
x > 
I
t ; that is when t > x.
7.5 Impact of higher punishment on sector allocation
Raising the audit rate pl or the punisment fee , increases the wedge,  l =
(1 + p + l) = (1 + z). Di¤erentiating equations (14),(15) and (11) with re-
spect to  l gives around the equilibrium:
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The impact on wages is then
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7.6 Impact of higher punishment on unemployment
rates
Raising the audit rate p or the punisment fee , increases the wedge,  l =
(1 + p + l) = (1 + z). Di¤erentiating equation (19) with respect to  l gives:
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
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Substitute for the derivatives and the rst order condition for search intensity
we obtain that dul=d l has the same sign as
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Hence
dul
d l
Q 0 if and only if  l Q 1:
The impact on the o¢ cial unemployment rate resulting from an increase
in the audit rate or the punishment fee, corresponds to
duol
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7.7 Impact of higher punishment on education
A closer examination of (17) reveals that changes in the audit rates or pun-
ishment rates a¤ect the share of educated workers, 1   e^; through  l only,
whereas changes in the tax rate, z, have a direct e¤ect on 1  e^ in addition to
the e¤ects working through  l. Therefore, in order to consider the e¤ects of
a fully nanced change in the punishment rates on the number of educated
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workers, we have to account for repercussions on 1  e^ following adjustments
in the tax rate. However, let us rst consider the impact on 1  e^ of a change
in the tax and expected punishment separately:
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Using equation (38) we obtain
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whereby the educational impacts become
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For existence of an interior solution for education we need yhoh ymom >
0. Hence, education increases if yh
doh
d h
  ym domd m > 0. As
dol
d l
; l = h;m is
negative, and yh=ym > om=oh, then for existence of an interior solution for e^,
if  domd m
 =  dohd h
 > yh=ym > om=oh (40)
42
then education increases with p. Consider the case where h > m. As  l
increases with l, then for such a solution to exist, we need that
 dold l  ; l =
h;m is decreasing in concealment costs whereby
 domd m  >  dohd h . We rst
show that that is the case. Multiply the numerator and denominator by  l
to obtain  dold l
 = ol(1+ol)(1  lol)
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
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using the expression from equation (39) gives
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and from the equilibrium equations we have d
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Fh =
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=d l > 0 and dol=d l <
0.
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Hence as
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< 0 then
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< 0 so when h > m then
 domd m  >  dohd h .
We observe
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< 0 both because the numerator decreases with  l and the
denominator increases with  l. Rewriting the expression determining the
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when h > m as the denominator of
 dold l  increases with  l. We conclude
that if yh
ym
2
h
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; g (h; m)
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i
education increases with p and when yh
ym
2h
g (h; m)
om
oh
;1
i
education falls with p.
7.8 Impact of higher punishment on unemployment
Raising the audit rate p or the punisment fee , increases the wedge,  l =
(1 + pl + l) = (1 + z). Di¤erentiating total unemployment with respect to
 l gives
dUTOT
d l
=
de^
d l
(um   uh) + e^dum
d l
+ (1  e^)duh
d l
:
The last two terms are positive ( 0) when  l is larger than one ( 1).
The rst term is positive if yh
ym
2
h
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; g (h; m)
om
oh
i
where g (h; m) > 1 if
h > m, and  l > (=)1. as then (um   uh) < (=)0 and de^d l < 0. However,
when  l < 1 and h > m then (um   uh) > 0 and in case de^d l < 0 then
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unemployment falls, dUTOT
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Total o¢ cial unemployment changes according too
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where the last two terms are negative and therefore when h > m we obtain
dUoTOT
d l
< 0 when de^
d l
 0 as (uom   uoh) > 0. When de^d l > 0 the sign of
dUoTOT
d l
is ambiguous.
7.9 Socially optimal solution for Fm; 
I
m; 
F
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I
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e^.
From the rst order conditions for tightness in the formal and informal sec-
tor for manual and highly educated workers, i.e.,@W
@Il
= 0; @W
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= 0; l = m;h;
we get the following conditions: 2sk
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cational level given by (26). To show that we have a global maximum we
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 1l   (1  l ) 1 = 0; l = m;h;
 sk  Il  12 + 12

1  k
I
l
(l)
1 

= 0; l = m;h;
 sk  Fl  12 + 12

1  k
F
l
(1  l)1 

= 0; l = m;h;
yh
kIh
(h)
1    ym
kIm
(m)
1 

  c (e^) = 0:
The associated Hessian matrix is then
(   1)Sm 0 0 0 0 0 0
  kIm
22  m
(   1) Im 0 0 0 0 0
km
2(1 m)2  (   1) 0 
F
m 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 (   1)Sh 0 0 0
0 0 0   kIh
22 h
(   1) Ih 0 0
0 0 0 kh
2(1 h)2  (   1) 0 
F
h 0
 ym (   1) k
I
m
(m)
2   ymk 1m 0 (   1) yh k
I
h
(h)
2  yhk (h)
 1 0 c0 (e^)

where Sl =
 
 2l + (1  l) 2

; l = m;h;Il =  12

sk
 
Il
  1
2 + k 1l

; l =
m;h and Fl =  12

sk
 
Fl
  1
2 + k (1  l) 1

; l = m;h:
Therefore, H1 = (   1)
 
 2m + (1  m) 2

< 0 and the principal mi-
nors alternate in sign, for all variable values, i.e.,H2 =   (   1)
 
 2m + (1  m) 2

Im >
0; ::::::; H7 = (   1)
 
 2m + (1  m) 2

Im
F
m (   1)
 
 2h + (1  h) 2

Ih
F
h c
0 (e^) <
0, by which we have a global maximum.
7.10 Optimal not to induce the socially e¢ cient stock
of education.
Evaluating (28) and (29) at pem and p
e
h such that the socially optimal level of
education is reached, i.e., dW
d(1 e) = 0. From 7 this requires that  
e
m > 1 >  
e
h:
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This yields: dW
dpm
j em>1= e^
h
dW
dFm
dFm
d m
+ dW
dIm
dIm
d m
+ dW
dm
dm
d m
i
d m
dpm
and dW
dph
j eh<1=
(1  e^)
h
dW
dFh
dFh
d h
+ dW
dIh
dIh
d h
+ dW
dh
dh
d h
i
d h
dph
. From the derivations of the socially
optimal solution for Fm; 
I
m; 
F
h ; 
I
h; m; h it follows that
dW
dFl
j l>1< 0; dWdIl j l>1>
0; dW
dl
j l>1> 0 and dWdFl j l<1> 0;
dW
dIl
j l<1< 0; dWldl j l<1< 0 as the welfare
function is maximized at  l = 1, i.e.,
dW
dFl
j l=1= dWldIl j l=1=
dWl
dl
j l=1= 0. It
then follows that dW
dpm
j em>1< 0 and dWdph j eh<1> 0.
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